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PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION IN BANKRUPTCY:                                                          
USING CONTRACT LAW PRINCIPLES TO INTERPRET                                           
AMBIGUOUS RETENTION ORDERS 
CALEB J. BARTEL* 
“[T]here are two tragedies in life.  One is to lose your heart‟s desire.  The other is to 
gain it.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In 1978, Congress‟ heart desired higher professional fees for services 
rendered in bankruptcy.2  Low and often arbitrary compensation was causing 
specialists to leave bankruptcy for more lucrative fields, thereby hurting debtors and 
creditors in the process.3  As a result, Congress reformed the Bankruptcy Code and 
enacted 11 U.S.C. § 3284 and 11 U.S.C. § 330.5   
Sections 328 and 330 each created a different approach to professional fees.  
The first approach allows a professional, hired by the trustee or a committee, to 
request an employment retention order under § 328(a) that fixes the terms and 
conditions of compensation.6  The bankruptcy court has the sole discretion to 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, UCLA School of Law, 2008; B.A., Pennsylvania State University, 2004.  I would like 
to thank Professor Mark Grady for his mentoring, advice, and suggestions.  I would also like to 
express my gratitude to Professors Kenneth Klee and Russell Korobkin for their willingness to spend 
their time discussing this project.  Finally, I am always indebted to my family for their never-ending 
love and support.  
1 BERNARD SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN act 4, 208 (Penguin Books 2004) (1903). 
2 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 
6286. 
3 Id. 
4  11 U.S.C. § 328 (2007).   
5 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2007).   
6 11 U.S.C. § 328(a); Robert J. Landry, III & James R. Higdon, A Primer on 11 U.S.C. 328(A) and Its 
Use in Alternative Billing Methods in Bankruptcy, 50 MERCER L. REV. 537, 541 (1999).  However, the judge 
may award compensation different from the fixed terms and conditions “if such terms and conditions 
prove to be improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the 
fixing of such terms and conditions.”  11 U.S.C. § 328(a).   
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approve a retention order and a fee arrangement under § 328.7  The second approach 
permits a professional to request a retention order and reserve compensation issues 
until the end of employment.8  At that time, the court awards “reasonable 
compensation” under § 330(a).9    
Each approach to professional fees provides distinct advantages.  Section 328 
rewards entrepreneurship, compensates for the professional‟s opportunity costs, 
allows the professional to manage risk, and reduces transaction costs.  In contrast, § 
330 reduces the bankruptcy court‟s information costs, reduces collusion among the 
trustee and the professional, and prevents strategic withholding by creditors.  
Bankruptcy courts attempt to gain the advantages of both approaches by writing 
ambiguous retention orders.  These orders purport to approve the professional‟s 
compensation under § 328 but reserve the court‟s ability to make a § 330 
reasonableness evaluation if the compensation appears excessive.10  However, 
ambiguous retention orders blend the two approaches and strip § 328 of the 
certainty it is meant to guarantee for professionals.11  As a result, professional fee 
awards are once again mired in arbitrariness.  Reviewing courts add to the 
uncertainty by interpreting ambiguous retention orders with conflicting default 
rules.12   
 Academic scholarship on professional fees in bankruptcy extends from 
arguments that high compensation signals the need for a “serious reform” of the 
                                                 
7 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (requiring court approval of a retention order and fee arrangement and 
giving the court the ability to later adjust the amount of compensation for improvident circumstances) 
with 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (allowing the court to award “reasonable compensation” for actual services 
rendered). 
8 11 U.S.C. § 330(a); Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 541.  
9 11 U.S.C. § 330(a); Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 541. 
10 See, e.g., In re Vern D. Blanchard, No. 96-12037-H7 1, 10-11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2005), 
www.casb.uscourts.gov/pdf/96_12037m.pdf. 
11 See id. (stating that ambiguous retention orders are subject to review under § 330). 
12 Compare Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin, Inc. (In re Circle K Corp.), 279 F. 3d 
669, 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2001) (amended Jan. 30, 2002) (holding that review under § 330 was 
appropriate when the retention order did not mention § 328 and included language stating that the 
retainer agreement was subject to review by the court) with Peele v. Cunningham (In re Tex. Sec., Inc.), 
218 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that review under § 330 is not appropriate when a court 
has approved the terms of an employment agreement). 
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entire Code13 to an exposition on the intricacies of § 328.14  Furthermore, at least one 
article highlights the negative effects of some bankruptcy courts‟ continued 
insistence on awarding below market compensation and suggests this to be a 
violation of due process.15  However, no scholarship has addressed the problem that 
reviewing courts face in interpreting ambiguous retention orders. 
 To this effect, I propose a solution which draws upon the interpretation 
principles and default rules of contract law.  Reviewing courts should first apply the 
maxim contra proferentem—ambiguity will be read against the drafter—to read 
ambiguous orders in favor of § 328.  If, however, the specific terms or rate of 
compensation remain uncertain after this maxim is applied, then reviewing courts 
should fill the gap with § 330.  This proposal creates an incentive for less ambiguous 
retention orders and enhances overall efficiency. 
 Only bankruptcy professionals consider personal compensation the goal of 
bankruptcy.16  However, compensation is what makes bankruptcy work.17  An 
increase in the uncertainty regarding professional fees is a signal that Congress‟ 
desires are sinking and both creditors and debtors will be left struggling in the water.  
Therefore, this problem invites further examination. 
 The body of this Article proceeds in four main sections.  Part II reviews the 
Congressional history of the 1978 bankruptcy reform and the mechanisms of the 
current §§ 328 and 330.  Part III examines the conflicting precedents of the Ninth 
and Fifth Circuits and briefly points out the problems associated with the rules 
adopted in each circuit.  Part IV compares the advantages of § 328 with the 
advantages of § 330 and examines why bankruptcy courts draft ambiguous retention 
orders.  Furthermore, Part IV provides an example from a recent case and explains 
why ambiguous retention orders are eroding Congress‟ goal of attracting qualified 
professionals to the bankruptcy arena.  Part V summarizes contract law principles for 
                                                 
13 Cynthia A. Baker, Other People’s Money:  The Problem of Professional Fees in Bankruptcy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 
35, 36-37 (1996). 
14 See Landry & Higdon, supra note 6. 
15 Ralph C. McCullough, II, Attorneys’ Fees in Bankruptcy: Toward Further Reform, 95 COM. L. J. 133, 162-
68 (1990). 
16 Baker, supra note 13, at 38. 
17 Id. 
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interpreting ambiguous contracts and applies these principles to propose a 
mechanism to aid reviewing courts in interpreting ambiguous retention orders.  
II.  CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY 
 In 1978, Congress enacted a bankruptcy reform act to modernize the 
Bankruptcy Code.18  The guiding principle of compensation under the old 
bankruptcy rules was “economy,”19 which placed “conservatism of the estate and 
return to creditors” above all other factors.20  Under the old rules, professionals were 
compensated “on a quantum meruit basis.”21  In enacting the reform, Congress 
reasoned that qualified specialists who could earn higher fees in other fields would 
leave the bankruptcy arena if the limits on professionals‟ compensation remained 
unchanged.22  Furthermore, the benefit of quality representation and efficient 
management to both the debtor and creditor far exceeded the savings of arbitrary fee 
                                                 
18 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 
5965. 
19 This principle is commonly referred to as “conservation of the estate and economy of 
administration.”  Seiler v. First Nat‟l Bank of Babbitt (In re Benassi), 72 B.R. 44, 47 (D. Minn. 1987) 
(citing In re Penn-Dixie Indus., 18 B.R. 834, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 6286.  Numerous other names exist for 
this principle.  See, e.g., GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 105 
(American Law Institute 1996) (referring to the “economy principle”); Leif M. Clark, Paying the Piper:  
Rethinking Professional Compensation in Bankruptcy, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 231, 231-32 (1993) 
(referring to the “economy standard”); McCullough, supra note 15, at 134 (referring to the “spirit of 
economy”). 
20 McCullough, supra note 15, at 134.  McCullough cites to Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, as an 
illustration of this principle.  Id. at 134 n.3 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 405 F.2d 429, 
432-33 (5th Cir. 1968)).  In Brock, the court remanded fee awards in which the lower court had 
considered the time involved, the complexity of the case, and the results obtained, but abused its 
discretion by failing to consider “the public interest which is inherent in bankruptcy matters . . . .”  Id. 
(citing Mass. Mutual Life Ins., 405 F.2d at 432-33).   
21 In re Benassi, 72 B.R. at 47; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 328.02, at 328-4 (Lawrence P. King et al. 
eds., 15th ed., 1996); see also Moshein v. Beverly Crest Convalescent Hosp., Inc. (In re Beverly Crest 
Convalescent Hosp., Inc.), 548 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1976) (amended Mar. 2, 1977), superseded by 
statute, 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1978) (reducing fee award to the hourly rate of a district judge).     
22 In re Benassi, 72 B.R. at 47; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 6286; Clark, supra note 19, at 232 (“[B]ankruptcy professionals 
were expected to be paid less for their services than they would receive in other kinds of work.  As a 
result, many able professionals simply avoided bankruptcy work altogether . . . .”).   
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cuts.23  Thus, Congress explicitly abandoned the principle of economy and allowed 
professionals to be compensated as in any other field.24   
 Four provisions of the reformed Code deal with the employment and 
compensation of professionals.25  First, § 327 authorizes the trustee, subject to the 
court‟s approval, to employ professionals to represent or assist the trustee in 
performing services for the estate.26  These professionals include, but are not limited 
to, attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and auctioneers.27  Second, § 328 authorizes 
the trustee or an appointed committee, with the court‟s approval, to employ a 
                                                 
23 In re Benassi, 72 B.R. at 47; McCullough, supra note 15, at 138. 
24 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 6286 
(“The effect . . . is to overrule . . . cases that require fees to be determined based on notions of 
conservation of the estate and economy of administration.”).  Furthermore, the House bill was passed 
over the Senate‟s version of the bill.  McCullough, supra note 15, at 137.  The Senate Report stated, 
“[t]he compensation is to be reasonable, for economy in administration is the basic objective.”  
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 5826.  
The Senate reasoned that “persons of merit and quality have not eschewed public service in 
bankruptcy cases merely because bankruptcy courts, in the interest of economy in administration, 
have not allowed them compensation that may be earned in the private economy of business or the 
professions.”  Id.  However, as mentioned, the House bill that was passed explicitly repudiated both 
of these ideas.  Id. at 6286; BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES & OFFICIAL FORMS 115 (Thomson West 
2007) (“[T]he policy of this section is to compensate attorneys and other professionals . . . at the same 
rate as the attorney or other professional would be compensated . . . .   Contrary language in the 
Senate report . . . is rejected . . . .”).  But cf. McCullough, supra note 15, at 152 (“Cuts of this kind, made 
without consideration of reasonable necessity, suggest that courts maintain a lingering adherence to 
the economy principle of the Act.”). 
25 These provisions, §§ 327, 328, 330, and 331, were enacted as part of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform 
Act.  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat. 2549) 5787, 
6284-87.  While all but § 331 have since been amended, none of the amendments substantively 
changed the statutes for the purpose of this Article.  Compare 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1978) (the initial 
provisions enacted) with 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2006) (incorporating amendments from 1984, 1986, 1994, 
and 2005).  See generally Cynthia A. Baker, Fixing What’s Broken:  A Proposal for Reform of the Compensation 
System in Bankruptcy, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 435, 435-36 (1996) (suggesting that the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1994 “tightened the standards” of professional compensation in bankruptcy but did 
not resolve its inherent problems).  
26 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2007); see also William H. Gindin, Professionals in Bankruptcy Proceedings: 
Appointment, Right to Compensation and Conflicts of Interest, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 895 (1991) (discussing 
appointment of professionals under § 327). 
27 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). 
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professional on any reasonable terms and conditions.28  These terms and conditions 
include performing work “on a retainer, on an hourly basis, on a fixed or percentage 
fee basis, or on a contingent fee basis.”29  If approved, the terms of employment can 
only be altered if they “prove to have been improvident in light of developments not 
capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions.”30  
This provision altered settled practices.  Under the previous rules, compensation was 
subject to the uncertainty of what a court would decide the work was worth after it 
was completed.31  Furthermore, contingency fee contracts were often invalidated.32  
Thus, § 328 provides professionals a means for predictability in their compensation.33  
 Third, § 330, subject to § 328, allows a court to award “reasonable 
compensation” to a professional.34  Section 330(a)(3) provides six factors that a court 
may use to determine a reasonable compensation.35  Congress further emphasized its 
intent to abandon the “economy principle” by making comparable compensation in 
cases other than bankruptcy one of the six factors.36  Lastly, § 331 allows a 
professional to be paid on an interim basis.37 
                                                 
28 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2007); see also Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 538-39 (discussing use of § 
328(a)). 
29 11 U.S.C. § 328(a). 
30 Id. 
31 Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. v. Nat‟l Gypsum Co. (In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co.), 123 F.3d 
861, 862 (5th Cir. 1997).  
32 Seiler v. First Nat‟l Bank of Babbitt (In re Benassi), 72 B.R. 44, 46-47 (D. Minn. 1987) (citing 
Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571, 575 (1923)). 
33 In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co., 123 F.3d at 862; Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 539.  
34 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2007). 
35 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3).  These factors are:  (1) “the time spent on such services;” (2) “the rates 
charged for such services;” (3) whether the services were necessary or beneficial; (4) whether the 
services were performed in a timely manner; (5) the qualifications and experience of the professional; 
and (6) the rates charged by “comparably skilled practitioners” in non-bankruptcy fields.  Id.   
36 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(F); Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, 543-44. 
37 11 U.S.C. § 331 (2007).  Without the ability for interim compensation, professionals were often 
forced to wait—sometimes for years—before receiving compensation.  McCullough, supra note 15, at 
144.  “This policy impaired efficient administration of the bankruptcy estate by forcing attorneys to 
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 In summary, Congress created two approaches for professionals to establish 
a fee arrangement.38  The first approach “is to request a retention order under [§] 328 
that fixes the terms and conditions of the employment.”39  Approval occurs before 
any services have been rendered.40  Once granted, the terms and conditions set forth 
in the court order govern compensation unless the bankruptcy court makes a finding 
of “improvidence” under § 328.41  The second approach “is to request approval to 
be employed” but reserve compensation issues until the filing of the fee 
application.42  Once the fee application is filed, the court awards reasonable 
compensation according to § 330.43  In adopting these two approaches, Congress 
sought to increase compensation to market levels for the express purpose of 
“attracting highly qualified professionals to the bankruptcy arena.”44       
III.  DIVERGENCE AMONG THE CIRCUITS 
 In most bankruptcy cases a flat fee is charged.45  As a result, problems 
regarding compensation typically only arise in the more complex Chapter 11 cases46 
                                                                                                                                     
„lend‟ their services to the estate:  unlike other attorneys, although they received no compensation 
while they worked on a case, they were of course still required to pay salaries and office overhead.”  
Id. 
38 See also Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 541.  Compare 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2007) (fixing the terms 
of employment in advance) with 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (allowing a court to award reasonable 
compensation after services are completed).   
39 Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 541. 
40 Seiler v. First Nat‟l Bank of Babbitt (In re Benassi), 72 B.R. 44, 47 (D. Minn. 1987). 
41 Id. 
42 Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 541. 
43 Id. 
44 In re Benassi, 72 B.R. at 49. 
45 Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 537. 
46 Id. at 538.  Chapter 11 cases generally deal with debtor rehabilitation or reorganization.  DAVID G. 
EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL 125 (West 7th ed. 2005).  In a Chapter 
11 case, the debtor retains possession of its assets and makes payments to creditors according to a 
court approved plan.  Id. at 126.  
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or when a professional is hired for a special purpose.47  However, even in those 
cases, a bankruptcy court generally reviews a professional‟s fee application under § 
330 after services have been provided.48  Thus, application of § 328 causes most of 
the problems.  As stated above, § 328 permits a professional to seek court approval 
of specific terms and conditions of compensation at the time of application for 
employment.49  Approval is discretionary.50  However, if granted, the retention order 
should state that employment is granted under § 328 and set forth the express terms 
and conditions that apply.51  While this is a routine matter in some districts, it is not a 
universal practice.52  Thus, an order granting employment can be ambiguous as to 
whether it is approving both the professional‟s employment and compensation, or 
simply the professional‟s employment.53  Appellate courts have fashioned default 
rules to deal with such ambiguity.54  These default rules can be understood by 
looking at the precedents of two circuits:  the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit.55 
A.  Ninth Circuit 
 In In re B.U.M. International, Inc., the debtor filed an application to employ a 
financial consultant who would receive a combination of both a monthly and a 
contingency fee.56  The bankruptcy court initially approved the application.57  
                                                 
47 Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 538. 
48 F.V. Steel & Wire Co. v. Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital L.P., 350 B.R. 835, 838-39 (E.D. 
Wis. 2006). 
49 11 U.S.C. § 328(a).   
50 Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 544. 
51 Id. at 546-47. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 547. 
54 Id.   
55 The Sixth Circuit has approached this differently.  See Nischwitz v. Miskovic (In re Airspect Air, 
Inc.), 385 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We hold that whether a court „pre-approves‟ a fee 
arrangement under § 328 should be judged by the totality of the circumstances, looking at both the 
application and the bankruptcy court‟s order.”). 
56 Friedman Enters., Inc. v. B.U.M. Int‟l, Inc. (In re B.U.M. Int‟l, Inc.), 229 F.3d 824, 825 (9th Cir. 
2000).  The agreement called for $7,500 per month, plus expenses, and contingency fees based on the 
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However, after objections were filed, the court conducted a hearing and determined 
that each professional employed under § 327 may have his fees reviewed for 
reasonableness once all services were rendered.58  One month later, the court entered 
an order approving the employment with “an additional proviso that „all fees and 
costs of [the consultant] are subject to Court approval.”‟59  When the consultant 
finished rendering services, he submitted a fee application.60  Although the monthly 
fees were approved, the court conducted a § 330 reasonableness evaluation and 
denied the contingency fee in its entirety.61  The district court affirmed.62 
 On review, the court of appeals first stated that “[t]here is no question that a 
bankruptcy court may not conduct a § 330 inquiry into the reasonableness of the fees 
and their benefit to the estate if the court already has approved the professional‟s 
employment under 11 U.S.C. § 328.”63  Second, the court noted that neither the 
application for employment nor the court‟s order referred to either § 328 or § 330.64  
Third, the court acknowledged the order‟s “proviso” making fees and costs subject 
to court approval.65  Finally, the court held that “while the bankruptcy court may 
have conditionally approved [the professional‟s] employment, it did not convey its 
complete approval under § 328.”66  Because the court “specifically reserved the right 
                                                                                                                                     
value of the secured debt, unsecured debt, unsecured trade debt, consideration received by the 
company, and capital.  Id. at 825-26.  
57 Id. at 826. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 827. 
61 Id.  Through this evaluation, the court concluded “that [the professional‟s services] had not 
benefited the estate.”  Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 829 (citing Pitrat v. Reimers (In re Reimers), 972 F.2d 1127, 1128 (9th Cir. 1992)).  
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
158           TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 9 
 
 
to review the fees,” a § 330 review was proper.67  The court distinguished the 
circumstances of In re B.U.M. International, Inc. from an earlier decision, In re Reimers.68   
Unlike In re Reimers, the court reasoned that the bankruptcy court‟s language put the 
professional on notice that the court had only conditionally approved the fee 
structure.69  However, the court commented that, in the future, the bankruptcy court 
should either accept or reject the fee agreement and not make acceptance 
conditional, as this would allow professionals to “know exactly where they stood 
before undertaking the engagement.”70 
 Similarly, in In re Circle K, a creditor‟s committee sought to employ a financial 
advising company.71  The retainer agreement specified that the company would be 
paid $100,000 per month.72  Although the agreement acknowledged that any 
compensation remained subject to a final fee application, it did not refer to § 328.73  
The bankruptcy court approved the employment in a retention order that mentioned 
neither § 328 nor § 330.74  On submission of the company‟s fee application, the court 
                                                 
67 Id. at 829, 831. 
68 Id. at 829.  In Reimers, the trustee requested the bankruptcy court‟s permission to employ an 
attorney.  In re Reimers, 972 F.2d at 1127.  The fee agreement between the parties provided that the 
attorney would be paid forty percent of the amount he recovered in litigating a claim for the debtor 
estate.  Id. at 1127-28.  The court approved both the employment and the fee arrangement in the same 
order.  Id. at 1128.  The professional successfully recovered $37,871.30, but when he applied for his 
fee, the court estimated an hourly rate and awarded him only $6,000.  Id.  Both the trustee and the 
professional filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.  Id.  The district court affirmed.  Id.  
On further appeal, the court stated that once a bankruptcy court approves a fee arrangement under § 
328, it cannot alter that arrangement without first finding “unanticipated developments” that render 
the original terms improvident.  Id.  Thus, the court held that the award was improper.  Id. at 1128, 
1129. 
69 In re B.U.M. Int‟l, Inc., 229 F.3d at 829. 
70 Id.  This is somewhat contradictive because the court previously stated that the conditional language 
in the order gave the professional notice that it was not approved under § 328. 
71 Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin, Inc. (In re Circle K Corp.), 279 F.3d 669, 672 
(9th Cir. 2001) (amended Jan. 30, 2002).   
72 Id.  
73 Id.  The exact language is:  “[a]ll fees so paid remain subject to subsequent Bankruptcy Court 
approval in a final fee application to be submitted to the Court.”  Id.             
74 Id. 
2007]    PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION IN BANKRUPTCY:  USING CONTRACT       159 
LAW PRINCIPLES TO INTERPRET AMBIGUOUS RETENTION ORDERS 
 
conducted a reasonableness review and awarded half of the requested fees.75  
However, on appeal, the district court reversed.76  The court held that the company 
had been approved under § 328, and, without a finding of “improvidence,” must be 
awarded its requested fees.77 
  The court of appeals disagreed.78  First, the court stated that the facts of the 
case before it were similar to In re B.U.M. International, Inc.79   Second, the court noted 
the lack of reference to § 328 in the application and the “subject to” language in both 
the application and the order.80  The court held that “the bankruptcy court had only 
conditionally approved the employment agreement and that § 330 review was 
therefore appropriate.”81  Further, the court cited the treatment of another 
professional in the same proceeding82 as well as the bankruptcy court‟s belief that it 
had only conditionally approved the company‟s fee agreement in support of its 
conclusion.83  The court explicitly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit‟s holding in In re 
National Gypsum Co., discussed below.84  
 
                                                 
75 Id.  The professional “submitted its first Final Fee Application „pursuant to Sections 327 and 330,‟” 
rather than pursuant to § 328.  Id. at 672 n.3.  However, an amended fee application stated that § 328 
was the appropriate standard.  Id.  The debtor contended that because the professional first cited § 
330, “it should be judicially estopped from now arguing that § 328 applies.”  Id.  The court refused to 
resolve this issue in light of its other holdings.  Id.  
76 Id. at 672. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 673. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Id.   
82 Id.  That professional explicitly cited § 328 in his application and the court‟s order stated that 
payments “shall be subject to the right of the Bankruptcy Court under 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) to review 
such payments.”  Id.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 673-74. 
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B.  Fifth Circuit 
 In In re National Gypsum Co., the debtor applied85 to employ a professional at a 
rate of $125,000 per month.86  The bankruptcy court issued an order approving both 
the employment and terms of payment but stated that it “retain[ed] the right to 
consider and approve the reasonableness and amount of [the professional‟s] fees on 
both an interim and final basis.”87  After the professional submitted a fee application, 
the court reduced the amount requested by $400,000.88  The court believed the lower 
figure represented “reasonable compensation in the light of hourly compensation 
that had been allowed in similar bankruptcy cases in the same district.”89  The district 
court affirmed, holding that review was appropriate because the bankruptcy court 
had only conditionally approved the fee agreement.90 
 On further review, the court of appeals reiterated Congress‟ impetus in 
enacting § 328: “Prior to 1978[,] the most able professionals were often unwilling to 
work for bankruptcy estates where their compensation would be subject to the 
uncertainties of what a judge thought the work was worth after it had been done.”91  
The court stated that the same uncertainty remained under § 330 but could be 
avoided by obtaining the court‟s approval under § 328.92  Thus, “[i]f the most 
competent professionals are to be available . . . they must know what they will 
                                                 
85 If a trustee is not appointed in a Chapter 11 case, the debtor is a debtor-in-possession.  EPSTEIN, 
supra note 46, at 131.  In this position, the debtor stands in as the trustee and can employ a 
professional under § 327.  COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 21, at § 327.01, at 327-4 n-1 to 327-
5. 
86 Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. v. Nat‟l Gypsum Co. (In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co.), 123 F.3d 
861, 862 (5th Cir. 1997). 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  The professional claimed it was owed $2,825,000 by virtue of the agreed monthly 
compensation.  Id.  However, the debtor objected to this amount and the parties agreed to reduce the 
compensation to $2,400,000.  Id.  The bankruptcy court further reduced this figure by $400,000 to 
$2,000,000.  Id.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id.  The court recognized that § 328 approval could still be reviewed under the “improvident” 
standard of § 328.  Id. 
2007]    PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION IN BANKRUPTCY:  USING CONTRACT       161 
LAW PRINCIPLES TO INTERPRET AMBIGUOUS RETENTION ORDERS 
 
receive . . . .  Courts must protect those agreements and expectations, once found to 
be acceptable.”93   
 Turning to the case before it, the court noted that the bankruptcy court 
could have approved the professional‟s retention and left compensation to be 
determined under § 330.94  Instead, the court expressly approved the compensation 
agreement. 95   The court held that the bankruptcy court granted § 328 approval and 
that the order‟s contingency language only “recited [the bankruptcy court‟s] control 
of compensation in the event of subsequent and unanticipated circumstances . . . .”96  
The court remanded for an award in accordance with § 328.97 
 Similarly, in In re Texas Securities, Inc., the trustee employed a law firm as 
special litigation counsel.98  The employment order provided that compensation 
would be forty percent of all assets recovered but did not specify whether § 328 or § 
330 governed.99  Slightly more than a year later, the bankruptcy court modified the 
order.100  The new order established a combination of contingent fee and hourly fee 
compensation but did not set a specific rate of payment.101  In the modifying order, 
the court specified that “it „[did] not modify, in any respect, [the court‟s] authority to 
review this and all employment orders in accordance with Section 328 of the Bankruptcy 
                                                 
93 Id. at 862-63. 
94 Id. at 863. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Peele v. Cunningham (In re Tex. Sec., Inc.), 218 F.3d 443, 444 (5th Cir. 2000).  Later, a single 
attorney replaced the firm.  Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  The initial order, dated April 6, 1994, was modified on October 20, 1995.  Id. 
101 See id. at 444-45. 
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Code.‟”102  After the final fee application was submitted, the court conducted a § 330 
evaluation and reduced the award.103  The district court affirmed.104 
 The court of appeals, citing In re National Gypsum Co., stated that „“[i]f prior 
approval is given to a certain compensation, § 328 controls . . . .”‟105  The court 
reiterated this holding stating “[s]ection 328 applies when the bankruptcy court 
approves a particular rate or means of payment, and § 330 applies when the court 
does not do so.”106  The court then reasoned that because both orders approved 
compensation structures governed by § 328, a reasonableness review was 
improper.107  Thus, the court reversed, instructing the bankruptcy court to recalculate 
the professional‟s fees in accordance with § 328 and to set the hourly rate at the rate 
the law firm charged on the date the modifying order went into effect.108 
C.  Summary 
 In cases where it is ambiguous as to whether § 328 or § 330 governs a 
professional‟s compensation, the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit are in conflict.109  
In the Ninth Circuit, if a bankruptcy court includes conditional language in the 
retention order, then § 330 governs a professional‟s fees, regardless of whether the 
                                                 
102 Id. at 445. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. (citing Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. v. Nat‟l Gypsum Co. (In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co.), 
123 F.3d 861, 862-63 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
106 Id.  The court also stated that “[o]nce the bankruptcy court has approved a rate or means of 
payment, such as a contingent fee, the court cannot on the submission of the final fee application 
instead approve a „reasonable‟ fee under § 330(a), unless the bankruptcy court finds that the original 
arrangement was improvident due to unanticipated circumstances as required by § 328(a).”  Id. at 445-
46. 
107 Id. at 446. 
108 See id. at 444-46. One judge dissented and argued that because the modifying order did not set a 
rate of compensation, the bankruptcy court should be allowed to set a reasonable rate, under § 330, 
for the post-modifying order compensation.  See id. at 446, 448.  
109 See supra Part II.A-B. 
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court pre-approves a fee arrangement.110  In contrast, in the Fifth Circuit, § 328 
governs a professional‟s fees if a court pre-approves a fee arrangement, regardless of 
whether it includes conditional language or only states a means of payment.111  
However, conditional language is not the only source of ambiguity.   Determining 
whether a court has pre-approved a fee arrangement or added conditional language 
to the order may also result in ambiguity.  Thus, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the 
Fifth Circuit provide bankruptcy courts or professionals a clear indication of when § 
328 will govern an ambiguous retention order.   
IV.  THE CAUSE OF AMBIGUOUS RETENTION ORDERS 
 The problem of deciding between ex ante and ex post compensation is a 
familiar one in service occupations.  Each fee structure has its unique advantages.  
For example, in the construction industry, the two common forms of contracts are 
the lump-sum contract and the cost-plus contract.112  In a lump-sum contract, the 
parties negotiate a fixed price before the project begins.113  As long as the contract is 
for a standard project, the lump-sum contract promotes efficiency.114  In contrast, a 
cost-plus contract compensates the contractor for actual costs and a percentage of 
the total cost of the project upon completion.115  The main advantage of a cost-plus 
contract is the ability to begin construction with incomplete design information.116  
Thus, “[t]he type of fee structure employed depends on the type of project, the goals 
of the parties, and the willingness of certain parties to accept the risk of either 
                                                 
110 Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin, Inc. (In re Circle K Corp.), 279 F.3d 669, 673 
(9th Cir. 2001) (amended Jan. 30, 2002); Friedman Enters., Inc. v. B.U.M. Int‟l, Inc. (In re B.U.M. Int‟l, 
Inc.), 229 F.3d 824, 825 (9th Cir. 2000). 
111In re Tex. Sec., Inc., 218 F.3d at 444; In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co., 123 F.3d at 863 (5th Cir. 1997). 
112 THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS BOOK:  HOW TO FIND COMMON GROUND IN NEGOTIATING 
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT CLAUSES 122 (Daniel S. Brennan et al. eds., 2004) 
(hereinafter “THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT BOOK”); see also JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY‟S GUIDE 
TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES § 2.4 (2d ed. 1990) (identifying lump-
sum contracts, cost-plus contracts, and cost-plus with a guaranteed maximum as the main types of 
construction contracts when classified according to method of pricing). 
113 FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTRUCTION LAW 20 (Carina Y. Enhada et al. eds., 2001). 
114 KEITH COLLIER, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 71-72 (3d ed. 2001). 
115 FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 113, at 21. 
116 COLLIER, supra note 114, at 86. 
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overpayment . . . or underpayment . . . for the . . . services provided.”117  Similarly, §§ 
328 and 330 each provide a distinct set of advantages for both professionals and 
bankruptcy courts. 
A. Advantages of § 328 Ex Ante Compensation 
 Section 328 provides a mechanism for bankruptcy courts to approve the 
terms and conditions of a professional‟s compensation before any services have been 
rendered.118  Advantages of this ex ante form of compensation include rewarding 
entrepreneurship, compensating the professional for opportunity costs, allowing the 
professional to manage risk, and reducing transaction costs. 
1.  Entrepreneurship 
 Ex ante compensation provides a reward for entrepreneurship.  Section 328 
allows the professional to receive approval of specific terms and conditions of 
employment.119  This creates an incentive for qualified professionals to locate the 
opportunities within the bankruptcy system where they can provide the most value.  
For example, if a professional works for a contingency fee based on the amount of 
assets drawn into the bankrupt estate, the professional will seek out the estate in 
which the greatest potential for assets exists.  Both the professional and the 
bankruptcy system benefit as particular problems are matched with particular skill 
sets.    
2.  Opportunity Costs 
 For professionals, the ex ante fee structure also compensates for opportunity 
costs associated with business that cannot be completed because of the bankruptcy 
employment.  By seeking a retention order from a bankruptcy court, the professional 
                                                 
117 THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS BOOK, supra note 112, at 201; see also JAMES ACRET, 
CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES §§ 2.12-2.13 (3d ed. 2006) (comparing 
briefly the advantages of the cost-plus arrangement to the advantages of the lump-sum form of 
payment); COLLIER, supra note 114, at 70-72, 86-87 (explaining the advantages and disadvantages of 
lump-sum and cost-plus contracts); Steven N.S. Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice 
of Contractual Arrangements, 12 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1969) (discussing the choice between types of contracts 
in agriculture). 
118 Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 538-39. 
119 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2007). 
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foregoes potential future business for the time period spent on that particular case.120  
Section 328 allows a professional to evaluate whether the terms and conditions of a 
particular employment are worth the lost opportunities. 
3.  Risk 
 Ex ante compensation allows professionals to manage risk.  Professionals can 
ask for increased fees or more certain compensation schemes121 if they anticipate an 
employment to be a particularly risky venture.  This allows professionals to balance 
increased risk against increased or more certain reward. 
4.  Transaction Costs 
 An additional benefit of ex ante compensation is a reduction in transaction 
costs.122  Professionals in bankruptcy are required to maintain and submit to the 
court detailed time records of all services rendered as part of their ex post fee 
applications.123  The resources of the court are unduly drained in reviewing these 
records, especially in large cases, 124 and an expert is often needed to comply with § 
330‟s review process.125  Furthermore, attorneys are compensated for the time spent 
preparing and defending fee applications.126  As with all professional fees, this 
                                                 
120 See In re Merry-Go-Round Enters., Inc., 244 B.R. 327, 331 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) (noting that the 
professional agreed that the representation of the estate would be given priority). 
121 See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (allowing any reasonable terms and conditions). 
122 But see generally David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking 
Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 64 (2005) (stating that 
“[r]educing transactions costs carries risks of reducing the benefits that these costs purchase.”). 
123 McCullough, supra note 15, 145-46 (requiring a detailed fee application and stating that “[a]t the 
very least, every fee application must contain a specific analysis of each task performed”).  See generally 
Pitrat v. Reimers (In re Reimers), 972 F.2d 1127, 1128 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring submission of 
additional documentation when requested by the court); In re Motor Freight Express, 80 B.R. 44, 46 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (“In the case of photocopying, counsel should inform the Court of the 
number of copies, the cost of each copy, and provide, if possible a breakdown of the reasons why 
photocopying of certain documents was necessary.”).  
124 Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 567. 
125 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) (2007) (outlining the factors used to award reasonable compensation); 11 
U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A)(i) (prohibiting compensation for duplicative services); 11 U.S.C. § 
330(a)(4)(A)(ii) (outlawing fees for services that were unnecessary or unlikely to benefit the estate). 
126 In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 662 (9th Cir. 1985); McCullough, supra note 15, 149. 
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additional compensation is paid out of the bankrupt estate.127  While ex ante approval 
does require hearings to set the fee arrangement, such hearings are less time 
consuming than the review of “voluminous fee applications” associated with ex post 
review.128   
B.  Advantages of § 330 Ex Post Compensation 
 Section 330 provides a mechanism by which bankruptcy courts can approve 
a professional‟s employment but reserve compensation issues until after the services 
have been rendered.129  Advantages of this ex post form of compensation include 
reducing the bankruptcy court‟s information costs, reducing collusion among 
trustees and professionals, and preventing strategic withholding by creditors. 
1.  Information Costs 
 Ex post compensation reduces the court‟s information costs.  It is impossible 
for courts to know the complete nature of the professional‟s employment before the 
services have been rendered.130  Because courts have limited information when 
attempting to predict the value of future services, they are more efficient at awarding 
reasonable compensation ex post rather than ex ante.  While courts may not know 
the exact nature of the services after they are completed, ex post compensation 
reduces much of the information costs associated with valuation. 
2.  Collusion 
 Ex post compensation prevents collusion between trustees and professionals.  
The bankruptcy system provides little incentive for a trustee to limit a professional‟s 
fee award.  First, if both the trustee and the professional are repeat players in the 
bankruptcy arena, the trustee is unlikely to “bargain down” the professional‟s 
                                                 
127 In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d at 662. 
128 Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 567.  Furthermore, bankruptcy courts are likely to become more 
efficient in § 328 hearings as a precedent of allowing and disallowing various compensation schemes 
under § 328 develops.   
129 Id. at 541; see 11 U.S.C. 328(a) (2006). 
130 See 11 U.S.C. 328(a) (allowing for modification of pre-approved terms and conditions if they 
“prove to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the 
fixing of such terms and conditions”) (emphasis added).  
2007]    PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION IN BANKRUPTCY:  USING CONTRACT       167 
LAW PRINCIPLES TO INTERPRET AMBIGUOUS RETENTION ORDERS 
 
requested compensation.    Second, in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases,131 the court 
awards the trustee compensation according to § 326:132  
The court may allow reasonable compensation . . . after the trustee 
renders such services, not to exceed 25 percent on the first $5,000 or 
less, 10 percent on any amount in excess of $5,000 but not in excess 
of $50,000, 5 percent on any amount in excess of $50,000 but not in 
excess of $1,000,000, and reasonable compensation not to exceed 3 
percent of such moneys in excess of $1,000,000, upon all moneys 
disbursed or turned over in the case by the trustee to parties in 
interest, excluding the debtor, but including holders of secured 
claims.133 
“Although these percentages were intended as limits on reasonable compensation, in 
practice they sometimes work like commissions . . . .”134  Thus, the trustee has a 
monetary stake in the amount brought into the estate, possibly aligning the trustee‟s 
interests with the professional rather than the bankruptcy court.  By allowing courts 
to evaluate the services after they are performed, and not as they are described by the 
trustee and the professional, ex post compensation mitigates the potential negative 
effects of collusion. 
3.  Strategic Withholding 
 Ex post compensation also prevents strategic withholding by creditors.  
Especially in Chapter 11 cases, creditors do not have an incentive to object to a 
professional‟s compensation even if the professional‟s services are unlikely to 
provide value.135  “In bankruptcy, the absolute priority rule combined with an 
                                                 
131 Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 are the most common forms of large bankruptcies.  EPSTEIN, supra note 
46, at 124-26.  The other three forms, Chapters 9, 12, and 13, deal, respectively, with government 
entities as debtors, family farmer bankruptcies, and individuals with “regular income,” unsecured debt 
of less than $307,675, and secured debt of less than $922,975.  Id. at 124, 126. 
132 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (2007).  Compensation of officers is awarded under § 330 which incorporates § 
326.  11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2007). 
133 11 U.S.C. § 326 (2007). 
134 TREISTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 107.  
135 I am perhaps understating the problem.  Bankruptcy Judge Harold Lavien asks:  
[W]ho is there to help the court make these [fee] evaluations?  Counsel may have 
fought bitterly during the case, but now each is self-interested in not rocking the 
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administrative expense priority for all professional costs requires the „last class in the 
money‟ to pay all [professional] fees incurred in the case . . . .”136  The “last class in 
the money” refers to the creditor who is last in line to receive payment and would 
receive payment but for the professional fees.137  Which creditor is the “last class in 
the money” remains uncertain as long as doubt remains regarding the debtor‟s 
value.138  In terms of a bankruptcy professional, as long as that professional‟s services 
will bring some benefit to the estate, the debtor‟s value will remain uncertain.  Thus, 
with ex ante compensation, creditors withhold information they have regarding the 
professional‟s services on the assumption that they will enjoy any benefit the services 
provide without incurring any of the cost.139  Ex post compensation prevents this 
effect.  Since an ex post award occurs after the services have been performed, a 
creditor will know if it is the “last class in the money.”  Thus, at least this creditor 
will have an incentive to object to an excessive fee. 
                                                                                                                                     
boat.  As a matter of fact, an argument might be made that counsel for the debtor, 
and certainly for the creditor‟s committee is, at the time of the fee hearing, in a 
conflict of interest position between his self-interest in his fee and his responsibility 
to his client.  The courts, until the 1978 Code at least, could fall back on the 
economic spirit of bankruptcy, but even that has been stripped away by Congress. 
Harold Lavien, Fees as Seen from the Bankruptcy Bench, 89 COM. L. J. 136, 136 (1984). 
Furthermore, Judge Lavien states that fee hearings in bankruptcy are not adversary proceedings.   
[S]eldom is there more than a cursory objection submitted to the court in any fee 
hearing.  After all, it is the nebulous estate‟s money, and tomorrow‟s counsel for 
the creditors‟ committee may be in the position of debtor‟s counsel.  Therefore, fee 
hearings become a mutual admiration society which may be explained as human 
nature . . . . 
Id. at 137-38; see also Peter Lattman & Henny Sender, Bankruptcy Fees Face Legal Test In Collins & 
Aikman Billing Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2006, at A15 (stating that creditor challenges to professional 
fees are rare). 
136 Baker, supra note 25, at 437. 
137 Id. at 442-43. 
138 Id. at 448. 
139 Id.  Baker suggests that lower priority classes either do not know they are the “last class in the 
money” because of doubts regarding the debtor‟s value or if they do know, believe that the 
professional‟s employment is their only road to recovery.  Id.  Furthermore, the transaction costs 
associated with objecting to the professional‟s fees make an objection less likely to occur even if the 
creditor is not hindered by the other obstacles.  Id. 
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C.  Seeking the Advantages of Both Ex Ante and Ex Post Compensation 
 By attempting to combine the advantages of both §§ 328 and 330, 
bankruptcy courts are writing ambiguous retention orders.   Bankruptcy courts likely 
prefer to approve a professional‟s employment under § 330 because of the 
advantages outlined above.  However, bankruptcy courts also recognize that if they 
are accurate in their ex ante evaluations, § 328 reduces transaction costs and appeases 
those professionals applying for pre-approval.  As a result, many bankruptcy courts 
are strategically drafting ambiguous retention orders in an attempt to procure the 
advantages of both approaches.  These orders purport to approve the professional‟s 
compensation under § 328 but reserve the court‟s ability to make an ex post 
reasonableness evaluation if the compensation looks excessive.   
 In re Vern D. Blanchard provides a recent example. 140  In that case, the trustee 
filed an application to employ an attorney to litigate various claims for the estate.141  
The bankruptcy court approved employment and a fifty percent contingency fee142 in 
an order stating that “compensation was „subject to further court approval after due 
notice and hearing, and subject to the provisions of Bankruptcy Code sections 328 
and 330 . . . .”‟143  The professional obtained a default judgment for $14,631,640 and 
successfully recovered assets in excess of the total claims against the debtor.144  The 
debtor was the only party to object to the fee application.145 
 In reviewing the professional‟s fee application, the bankruptcy court noted 
that the retention application did not cite § 328.146  The court further explained that 
“the order[,] while purporting to base the fees on section 328, also provided the 
                                                 
140 In re Vern D. Blanchard, No. 96-12037-H7 1 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2005), 
www.casb.uscourts.gov/pdf/96_12037m.pdf. 
141 Id. at 2. 
142 Id. at 103.  There was disagreement as to whether the contingency fee applied to all assets 
recovered or only those necessary to pay the creditors.  Id. at 3.  In either case, it appears that the fifty 
percent number was not in dispute.  Id. 
143 Id. at 2 (citing Order ¶ 3).  
144 Id. at 2, 3. 
145 See id. at 3. 
146 Id. at 10. 
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court discretion to review the reasonableness of the fees pursuant to section 330.”147  
Therefore, the bankruptcy court reasoned that because its own order had cited both 
§§ 328 and 330, the order was ambiguous as to which section applied to the fee 
application.148  Thus, the court conducted a § 330 reasonableness review.149 
D.  Consequences of Ambiguity 
 In attempting to gain the advantages of both §§ 328 and 330, bankruptcy 
courts are creating a precedent of arbitrary enforcement that is likely to eliminate the 
advantages that Congress intended to create by enacting § 328.  Ambiguity can have 
value.150  Ambiguous retention orders offer bankruptcy courts the advantages of 
both §§ 328 and 330 by providing them a means for correcting inaccurate ex ante 
approvals.  However, this system only works if bankruptcy courts have a reputation 
for fair enforcement.  While bankruptcy courts have used ambiguous retention 
orders to decrease excessive fees, they have not used the same mechanism to 
increase meager fees.151  Thus, bankruptcy courts have only enforced the system in a 
way that lowers professionals‟ pre-approved compensation.   
                                                 
147 Id. at 10-11. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 11 (citing Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zuken, Inc. (In re Circle K Corp.), 
279 F.3d 669 (9th Cir. 2001) (amended Jan. 30, 2002)).  After a reasonableness review, the court 
concluded that the attorney was entitled to fifty percent “of the proceeds necessary to pay creditor 
claims plus interest and administrative expenses.”  Id. at 13.  However, the court left the calculation of 
the “exact dollar amount” to the trustee.  Id. at 12.   
150 Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness:  An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 
CAL. L. REV. 541, 545 (1994) (recognizing the benefits of vagueness and stating that “vagueness, by 
improving the ability of limitedly competent courts to control behavior optimally, may be 
institutionally advantageous.”). 
151 See Smith v. Lounsbury (In re Amberjack Interests, Inc.), 326 B.R. 379 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).  In 
Amberjack Interests, the court stated that even if it were to conduct a § 330 review, the result would not 
be a higher fee award.  Id. at 387.  However, Amberjack Interests appears to be the only published 
opinion in which a bankruptcy court has even considered whether to increase compensation 
potentially governed by § 328.  In contrast, numerous courts have decreased what they hold to be an 
excessive § 328 fee.  E.g., In re Susan L. Gilbertoson, 340 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) 
(holding that the early and easy resolution of the case made the pre-approved contingency fee 
improvident).  While it is possible that collusion between the trustee and the professional is so 
extensive that professionals never underestimate the amount of work a particular employment will 
entail, it is more likely that this situation is the result of bankruptcy courts surreptitiously enforcing the 
“economy” principle.  See generally McCullough, supra note 15 at 133, 138 (discussing the purported 
abandonment of the old “spirit of economy” and finding that the “the legacy of the old approach 
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 Congress enacted § 328 to provide professionals with a means for 
predictability.152  Ambiguous retention orders eliminate this predictability by blending 
§§ 328 and 330 together.  While the Fifth Circuit is more favorable to professionals 
seeking § 328 approval than the Ninth Circuit, neither circuit‟s approach provides 
professionals with a clear rule for when § 328 will govern.  Thus, there is an 
increased likelihood that highly qualified professionals who desire the advantages § 
328 provides will once again leave the bankruptcy arena for more lucrative fields.   
V.  INTERPRETING AMBIGUOUS RETENTION ORDERS 
 The uncertainty created by ambiguous retention orders and the harm they 
cause can be eliminated at the appellate level.  To terminate this uncertainty, 
retention orders should be viewed as contracts between bankruptcy courts and 
professionals.  In addition, reviewing courts should use contract law principles to 
interpret ambiguous retention orders.   
A.  An Overview of Contract Law Principles 
 A contract is ambiguous on its face when it either has conflicting terms or 
does not contain a provision covering the dispute that has arisen.153  In the first 
instance, courts apply interpretive rules to determine what the contract says.154  In 
the second, courts apply default rules to fill any gap.155  Arguably, no analytical 
distinction exists between the two types of rules, and both can be classified as default 
rules.156 
                                                                                                                                     
persists as seen in the courts arbitrary reduction in attorneys‟ fees.”).  In either case, only bankruptcy 
courts are gaining an advantage from ambiguous retention orders which will affect professionals‟ 
behavior in deciding whether to accept a particular employment within the bankruptcy arena.           
152 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
153 Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual 
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 535 (1998). 
154 Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 565-
66 (2006). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 566. 
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 There are two types of default rules:  majoritarian and penalty.157  
Majoritarian default rules are further divided into two additional categories:  tailored 
and untailored.158  Tailored rules interpret ambiguous terms in a contract to mean 
what is most efficient for the particular contract—they are individualized.159   In 
contrast, untailored default rules interpret ambiguous terms in a contract to mean 
what most parties would want in the contract—they are one-size-fits-all.160  Both 
rules reduce the consequences of high transaction costs by allowing parties to enter 
into incomplete contracts with the knowledge that courts will interpret the contract 
in a manner that promotes efficiency.161   
  In contrast, penalty default rules interpret ambiguous terms in a contract to 
mean what one party, or both, would not have wanted.162  Penalty default rules 
promote complete contracts by discouraging the strategic withholding of 
information among parties.163  In addition, the rules minimize the incentive for 
“externalizing the cost of interpreting the contract on the courts.”164   
 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner suggest that the choice of rule should be 
governed by the reason for incompleteness.165  They identify two broad reasons for 
                                                 
157 See generally Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, 586-87 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing the choice between 
majoritarian and penalty default rules); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling in Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts:  An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (discussing penalty default 
rules); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:  Success or Failure?, 112 YALE 
L.J. 829 (2003) (describing the effect of choosing either majoritarian or penalty default rules). 
158 Ayres, supra note 157, at 586 (refers to untailored rules as “one-size-fits-all”). 
159 Id. at 586; Posner, supra note 153, at 547. 
160 Ayres, supra note 157, at 586; Posner, supra note 153, at 547. 
161 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 92-93; Posner, supra note 157, at 839. 
162 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 91, 97; Posner, supra note 157, at 839.  But see Posner, supra 
note 154, 563 (arguing that penalty default rules do not exist).  
163 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 91, 97; Posner, supra note 157, at 839. 
164 Posner, supra note 157, at 839. 
165 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 127 (“The first step . . . should be to ask „why does the gap 
exist?‟”). 
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incompleteness:  strategic incompleteness and transaction costs.166  Strategic 
incompleteness is the withholding of information essential to form a complete 
contract.167  Parties may strategically withhold information to gain a bargaining 
advantage.168  To borrow Ayres and Gertner‟s metaphor, a party might withhold 
information that would increase the overall size of the pie, in an effort to increase its 
share of the pie.169  Transaction costs are the costs associated with both negotiating 
and enforcing a contract.170  If the costs of contracting for a certain provision exceed 
that provision‟s benefit, rational parties would leave the contract incomplete.171   
 According to Ayres and Gertner, when a gap exits because of strategic 
incompleteness, a penalty default is appropriate.172  When a gap exists because of 
transaction costs, a majoritarian default rule is appropriate.173  However, a penalty 
default rule is “appropriate when it is cheaper for the parties to negotiate a term ex 
ante than for courts to estimate ex post what the parties would have wanted.”174   
Additionally, courts should be sensitive to the effects created by penalty defaults,175  
                                                 
166 Id. at 92-94.  But cf. Hadfield, supra note 150, at 547-48, 550 (identifying four reasons for 
incompleteness in contracts:  transaction costs, strategic deferral, strategic withholdings, and 
uncertainty of the law). 
167 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 94. 
168 Id.  at 99-100. 
169 Id. at 94, 99. 
170 Id. at 92-93; Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 122, at 62, 84. 
171 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 92, 93. 
172 Id. at 94. 
173 Id. at 93.  
174 Id. at 127-28; see also Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019, 1021 n.4 (Del. 2001) (“Because 
majoritarian rules reduce transactions costs, they are preferred-unless there is a reason to select a 
„penalty default‟ rule that forces parties with superior information to disclose some of that 
information . . . .”). 
175 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 128.  Ayres and Gertner warn that if the information being 
withheld is private and “acquired with economic resources, the value of information revelation must 
also be weighed against the private incentives to acquire it.”  Id.   
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as well as the possibility that some market correctives may produce inefficiencies in 
other markets.176 
B.  Interpreting Ambiguity and Gaps 
 As discussed in Part IV, bankruptcy courts are acting strategically by drafting 
ambiguous retention orders.  A penalty default creates an incentive for bankruptcy 
courts to draft more complete orders.  Thus, ambiguity should be interpreted in 
favor of § 328.   However, if ambiguity remains in the fee structure, § 330 should 
govern the professional‟s compensation. 
1.  Contra Proferentem 
 Ambiguous retention orders should be interpreted against bankruptcy courts.  
In both contract disputes and pseudo-contract disputes,177 courts have long used the 
interpretive maxim contra proferentem:  ambiguities in written contracts will be 
construed against the drafter.178  The rule places “the risk of ambiguity, lack of 
clarity, and absence of proper warning on the drafting party which could have 
forestalled the controversy.”179   It also creates an incentive for contract drafters to 
use clear language and saves non-drafting parties from “hidden traps not of their 
own making.”180  However, the maxim is only applied when the contract‟s ambiguity 
is latent—non-obvious—in character.  If the ambiguity is patent—obvious—then 
the non-drafter has a duty to seek clarification from the drafting party.181 
                                                 
176 Thomas S. Ulen, Courts, Legislatures, and the General Theory of Second Best in Law and Economics, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 189, 216 (1998).  However, the authors point out that it is the legislature, and not the 
courts, that should deal with these concerns because courts “competency is limited by the arguments 
of the parties before them in light of legal precedent and social custom.”   Id. at 217, 218.  
Furthermore, courts would be overstepping their function if they considered such far removed 
effects.  Id. at 217. 
177 United States v. Transfiguracion, 442 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (using contra proferentem to 
interpret a criminal plea agreement against the government). 
178 See e.g., Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. 117, 128 (1877); JEFFREY FERRIELL & MICHAEL NAVIN, 
UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 266 (LEXIS 2004). 
179 Sturm v. United States, 421 F.2d 723, 727 (Ct. Cl. 1970). 
180 Id. 
181 H & M Moving, Inc. v. United Statesm, 499 F.2d 660, 671 (Ct. Cl. 1974).  Compare Id. (construing 
ambiguous language that is latent in character in a contract for moving services against the 
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 Contra proferentem is a penalty default rule that induces the drafting party to 
relate information to the other parties to the contract.182  In the professional fees 
context, contra proferentem would initially interpret ambiguous retention orders in favor 
of § 328.183  Thus, it would eliminate the incentive for bankruptcy courts to draft 
incomplete orders when they wish to approve a professional‟s employment under § 
330.184 
 For example, in In re Vern D. Blanchard, the retention order stated that 
“compensation was „subject to further court approval after due notice and hearing, 
and subject to the provisions of Bankruptcy Code sections 328 and 330 . . . .”‟185  
First, a reviewing court would have to decide whether the order is ambiguous.186  
Second, if the court considers the order to be ambiguous, the court would need to 
determine whether the ambiguity was patent or latent.  This order, if found to be 
                                                                                                                                     
government) with Chris Berg, Inc. v. United States, 455 F.2d 1037, 1044-45 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (finding that 
the ambiguity was “patent and glaring,” and thus, the plaintiff had a duty to seek clarification). 
182 Ayres, supra note 157, at 587.  But see Posner, supra note 153, at 578-80 (arguing that the contra 
proferentem rule, if classified as a default rule, is majoritarian).  
183 This assumes that the professional is arguing that he was employed under § 328.  This is a safe 
assumption.  A professional would not argue that he was employed under § 330 when the bankruptcy 
court contends it employed him or her under § 328 because a § 330 reasonableness evaluation could 
never guarantee higher compensation than a fee structure approved under § 328. 
184 It would do this by directly affecting the sources of judicial utility: reputation and popularity 
amongst other judges and members of the legal profession; prestige; and avoiding reversal.  See 
Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 1, 13-15, 31 (1993).   Furthermore, bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges; thus, 
the “carrot” of possible promotion would have higher utility to bankruptcy judges than the federal 
appellate judges focused on by Judge Posner.  See id. at 4-7.  Moreover, promotion is likely influenced 
by the aforementioned sources of utility.  Therefore, the sources may have an even higher value for 
bankruptcy judges. 
185 In re Vern D. Blanchard, No. 96-12037-H7 1, 2 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2005), 
www.casb.uscourts.gov/pdf/96_12037m.pdf (citing Order ¶ 3).  
186 There is a strong argument that the order unambiguously approves the professional under § 328.  
Section 330 is made explicitly “subject to” § 328.  11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2007).  Furthermore, § 328 
only covers fees, not expenses.  Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 555.  Reimbursement of expenses 
is governed by § 330(a)(1)(b), which provides for “reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.”  11 
U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(b).  Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the order is that § 328 governed the 
compensation for services rendered and other compensation, such as the reimbursements of 
expenses, was governed by § 330. 
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ambiguous, would be latent because §§ 328 and 330 are not mutually exclusive.187  
Third, the court would interpret the order such that § 328 governed the 
professional‟s compensation as long as the order specified a specific rate and means 
of payment. 
2.  Filling Gaps 
 A gap exists when the fee structure is ambiguous after the order is 
interpreted against the bankruptcy court.  In such a case, § 330 should govern the 
professional‟s compensation.  In contract disputes, a contract that does not state a 
price is, by default, either interpreted to incorporate a reasonable price188 or is not 
enforced due to lack of completeness.189  However, in the professional fees context, 
neither of these solutions is satisfactory.  First, a rule that incorporates a reasonable 
price into the order is unhelpful.  Both §§ 328 and 330 are designed to award 
reasonable compensation.190  Thus, to say that a court should imply a reasonable fee 
is tautological.  Second, refusing to enforce the retention order eliminates approval 
of the professional‟s employment.  Such a rule creates the possibility that 
professionals either would not be compensated for services already performed or 
would be penalized for contesting an ambiguous retention order.  Either result 
would be unjust. 
 An incomplete fee structure is more likely the result of transaction costs than 
strategic incompleteness.  Section 328 is explicitly limited to situations where 
particular compensation “terms and conditions” have been pre-approved by the 
bankruptcy court.191  Professionals could not reasonably expect § 328 to govern 
compensation if a specific rate and means of payment were not approved in the 
retention order.  Moreover, if either of these were ambiguous, professionals would 
be on notice to seek clarification.  Therefore, an incomplete fee structure is indicative 
of the courts and professionals‟ inability to agree on a fee arrangement because of 
                                                 
187 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
188 E.g. U.C.C. § 2-305(1)(3) (2007). 
189 U.C.C. § 2-305(3)-(4) (2007).  But see Echols v. Pelullo, 377 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2004) (refusing to 
invalidate a boxing contract that failed to specify the price of each fight because the contract 
established the relationship between the parties and price was not a material and essential term). 
190 See Landry & Higdon, supra note 6, at 567 (“To obtain the benefit of section 328 . . . requires prior 
approval of the fee contract, which in turn usually requires some type of reasonableness test.”). 
191 See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2007). 
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the transaction costs associated with pre-approval.  Furthermore, Congress intended 
§ 330 to govern professionals‟ fees unless there was prior agreement to a fee 
arrangement, prescribing § 330 as the untailored majoritarian default rule.  Thus, 
because an ambiguous fee arrangement is likely the result of transaction costs, 
Congress‟ majoritarian default rule, § 330, should be used to fill the gap. 
 For example, in In re Texas Securities, Inc., the bankruptcy court‟s modifying 
order established a combination of contingent fee and hourly fee compensation but 
did not set a specific rate of payment.192  Furthermore, the modifying order stated 
that “it „[did] not modify, in any respect, [the court‟s] authority to review this and all 
employment orders in accordance with Section 328 of the Bankruptcy Code.”‟193  A 
reviewing court might find the later language ambiguous and use contra proferentem to 
make an initial finding that § 328 governs the professional‟s compensation.  
However, because the order only states the means of determining payment and not 
the rate, § 330 would ultimately govern the order. 
C.  Summary 
 Reviewing courts should use contract law principles to interpret ambiguous 
retention orders.  Courts should apply contra proferentem to read ambiguous orders in 
favor of § 328.  However, if a gap remains, § 330 should be the default rule.  This 
proposal will increase clarity in professional compensation through more complete 
retention orders.  Although bankruptcy courts considering a professional‟s retention 
application will have to decide between the advantages of § 328 and the advantages 
of § 330, statutory reform is the proper solution to any problems associated with this 
decision.  Hopefully, the proposed interpretive strategy will highlight these problems 
for Congress by restoring the distinction between §§ 328 and 330 that Congress 
desired when it reformed the Bankruptcy Code.    
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 Numerous critics have decried the “staggering” height of professional fees in 
bankruptcy proceedings.194  “For better or worse, professional compensation is the 
„lightening rod‟ of the bankruptcy system, attracting adverse publicity for a system 
that already suffers from misunderstanding at the hands of the public and the 
                                                 
192 Peele v. Cunningham (In re Tex. Sec., Inc.), 218 F.3d 443, 444-45 (5th Cir. 2000). 
193 Id. at 445. 
194 E.g., Baker, supra note 13, at 35. 
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press.”195  However, the solution is statutory reform, not ambiguous retention orders 
and conflicting interpretative standards.   
 While Congress‟ desire for a competitive compensation scheme will attract 
qualified professionals to the bankruptcy arena, the courts‟ arbitrary and uncertain 
interpretation will deeply undermine this effect.  Professionals need to feel secure in 
the status of their compensation, even if this security is only the knowledge that their 
fee is subject to a “reasonableness” review.  Ambiguous retention orders are, at best, 
disconcerting, and at worst, dishonest.  Furthermore, they only soften the problems 
associated with choosing between ex ante and ex post compensation while producing 
additional and more costly effects.  Reviewing courts must create an incentive for 
clarity.  Using contract law principles to interpret ambiguous retention orders will 
achieve this result.  Otherwise, qualified professionals will once again start an exodus 
toward more lucrative fields.  This would be a tragedy not only for Congress but also 
for debtors and creditors—the very parties the bankruptcy system is meant to assist. 
 
                                                 
195 Clark, supra note 19, at 235. 
